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I. INTRODUCTION 
Governments and political parties differ in their approaches to develop- 
ment. Some stress economic growth under the leadership of an elite, while 
at the same time limiting as much as possible the broad distribution of 
economic and social rewards, and limiting political participation. These 
we may call the developmentalists. Others-revolutionaries comprising 
a counter-elite-would reconstruct society in the interests of a radical 
redistribution of income and political power, perhaps, but not necessarily, 
as a prerequisite for sustained economic growth. Still others, the pluralists, 
would more nearly balance considerations of economic growth and the 
distribution of income and other rewards by allowing the more or less free 
competition of elites and would-be elites. 
A fourth approach to development partakes of features of all three of 
the above, yet melds them in a distinctive combination. This is populism, 
by which I mean a political movement characterized by the mobilization by 
(usually marginal) elites of a heterogeneous mass base, beyond or "above" 
existing attachments, and offering a new cross-sectional identity focusing 
on a leader, the nation, social justice, or typically all three. Populism thus 
combines the elite leadership of the developmentalist approach, the mobil- 
izational and redistributive emphases of the revolutionaries, and the 
heterogeneity or coalitional aspect of pluralism. While not confined to 
Latin America, nor necessarily dominant there, populism is nonetheless a 
common, if little understood and often overlooked, approach to develop- 
ment in the region. In particular, it has been notably a more prevalent and 
more popular approach to development than has been the revolutionary one. 
Since 1958 Colombian governments have exemplified, even archetypicalIy, 
the developmentalist approach toward economic and social policy. They 
did so until 1974 under the aegis of a rather special political arrangement 
called the Frente National. The Frente was a formalized coalition between 
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Colombia's two historic, elite-dominated parties, the Conservative and the 
Liberal. For the sixteen years between 1958 and 1974 these two parties 
were to hold-by constitutional fiat-equal numbers of seats in legislative 
bodies and in appointive posts at all levels of government (including the 
cabinet). The presidency was to alternate every four years between members 
of the two parties. The purpose of such an arrangement was to bring to an 
end the earIier fraticidal warfare between adherents of the two "hereditary 
hatreds," and at the same time to forestal1 a recrudescence of the military 
dictatorship which in the years 1953-1957 had appeared to threaten the 
traditional hold of the civilian elites over the Colombian political system. 
A further objective, implicit but not incidental, was to promote the develop- 
ment of the country under the suzerainty of those same elites.' 
To the surprise of some, the National Front survived for its proffered 
sixteen years with only slight forma1 modifications. Furthermore, despite 
at times significant opposition to the agreement from dissident factions of 
the two traditional parties, such oppositions hardly challenged the develop- 
mentalist stance of the Frente Nacional. 
By the late 1960s, however, the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) of 
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the man who had ruled as dictator 1953- 
1957, had begun to challenge the Frenre more seriously, and on partially 
different grounds. For ANAPO attacked the Frente not only on the 
propriety of an institutionalized sharing of power between Colombia's 
parties, it also sought to appeal to Colombians apart ffom or "above" their 
historic partisan loyalties, and on the basis of appeals for social justice and 
identification with the person and previous regime of the erstwhile dictator, 
Founded by Rojas (who had been permitted by the government to return 
from exile) and a handful of supporters in 1961, ANAPO first ran candi- 
dates (as a Conservative faction) in 1962. In subsequent elections it ran 
candidates under the Liberal label as well. It gained in strength until in 
1970 its presidential candidate, General Rojas himself, won 39% of the 
vote and, in a multi-candidate race, almost the presidency. Anapistas, in 
fact, claimed that they had been fraudulently denied victory over the 
government's candidate. 
Two aspects of the rise of ANAPO especially concern us in this paper. 
One is the meaning for Colombia of the rise of the first mass party giving 
priority to income redistribution over economic development "from above." 
The second is the significance of the fact that the principal political chal- 
lenge to developmentalism has taken the form of populism rather than a 
more strictly class-oriented, Marxist and/or revolutionary movement, 
which in some politicaI and academic quarters would seem to be the 
expectation. The implications indeed extend beyond Colombia to suggest 
some things concerning the nature of political development in Latin 
America generally. 
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I will first seek to marshal the empirical evidence to delineate the nature 
of Colombian populism, and especially to distinguish it from the develop- 
mentalist parties of the Frente Nacional, as well as from a strictly class- 
oriented revolutionary party, The evidence is of several kinds. The first 
encompasses the roots of ANAPO's support in the population and consists 
largely of a post-election (1970) survey conducted in Bogota; both pre- 
electoral and post-electoral surveys, as well as a I968 survey, carried out in 
Cali (Colombia's third largest city); and a study of voting by barrio in 
Bogota and Medellin (Colombia's second city) based on aggregate data.2 
I will then examine, more briefly, the social and political backgrounds of 
the ANAPO leadership, based in considerable pqrt on the studies of con- 
gressional and party leadership carried out at the Universidad de 10s Andes 
in BogotA.3 A content analysis of party programs and the party press lends 
further support to the analysis. There will follow a brief examination of 
Anapista organization and campaign techniques, based both on the party's 
own documents and on interviews with Anapista officials. 
Finally, since ANAPO is no longer wholly what it was in its heyday, 
either in its characteristics or in its dimensions, we need to examine the 
changes which have taken place since April 1970, when its candidate nearly 
won the presidency of Colombia. 
Having presented the evidence relating to ANAPO as a political move- 
ment, I will conclude by seeking to draw out the developmental and 
theoretical implications of the analysis as they relate both to Colombia 
and, more broadly, to political development in Latin America. 
11. ANAPO-ELECTORAL SUPPORT 
ANAPO, and political movements like ANAPO, pose an initial paradox 
because, while they draw much of their support on the basis of class align- 
ments within the electorate that were previously quite unfamiliar to the 
country's partisan politics, they also receive important backing from some 
of the most tradition-minded elements in the society. In CoIombia's case 
this heterogeneity becomes clear from an analysis of the Anapista vote. 
There is no question that in the country's largest cities the vote for 
president in 1970 was strongly polarized along class lines, with the have-nots 
voting in substantial numbers for ANAPO's candidate, General Rojas. 
Both surveys and aggregate data show that the vote for ANAPO con- 
sistently increases as one descends the social scale, and that some 60-65% 
of the lower class vote went to ANAPO, a percentage which apparently 
exceeds that of other Latin American countries with significant class voting 
such as Chile and Argentina, and is not far behind the percentage of the 
working class vote going to working class parties in such European 
countries as Sweden and Italy.4 
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This was a startling development for Colombia, with its two historic 
multiclass parties. It appeared that ANAPO had brought about a substan- 
tial shift, from a "vertical" to a "horizontal" axis of politics, at least in the 
large cities in the 1970 election. 
Certain qualifications need a t  once to  be made, however. In the first 
place, the available surveys and barrio-level studies only reflect the vote in 
Colombia's three largest cities, which contain only 20% or so of the nation's 
population. 
Secondly, the real dividing line among the classes in their support for 
Rojas came not between the lower two classes and the others, but between 
the middle and lower-middle class, at least in the barrio analysis, where 
these categories were distinguished (see table 1). 
TABLE I 
OFFICIAL VOTING RESULTS IN STRATIFIED BARRIOS, BOGOTA 
(In percentages) 
Pastrana Rojas Betancur Sourdis Blank Total 
CLASS 
Upper 75.8 8.3 11 9 3.5 .4 100 
Upper-mlddle 67.0 11.9 17.6 3.0 .5 100 
M~ddle 56.4 19.5 20.9 2.4 .8 100 
Lower-m~ddle 35.5 50.0 13.0 .8 .7 100 
Lower 27.8 62.7 8.3 .3 .8 100 
Slum 11.8 84.0 3.0 0.0 1.2 100 
TOTAL 40.8 44.6 12.6 1.2 .8 100 
Source: Campos and McCamant, p. 60. 
Put another way, Rojas received 50% of the vote in lower-middle class 
barrios, while his principal opponent-the candidate of the Frente Nacional 
coalition-got only 36%. 
The authors of the 1970 Cali surveys further show, by means of a kind 
of causal modeling, that attitudes toward the performance of the Frente 
Nacional government were more strongly and directly correlated with the 
vote than were variables such as social class.5 This suggests that, even in 
the large cities, ANAPO's I970 vote may best be viewed as an expression 
of protest which crosscut social classes, even though ANAPO did appeal 
more to lower than to higher social strata. 
It is further worth noting that ANAPO received disproportionate 
support in the large cities in 1970 from the 21-30 age group, with the 
numbers of this age group actually voting approximately doubling between 
1968 and 1970.6 Age, then, was a socio-economic variable other than class 
which helped to account for General Rojas's strong urban showing in 1970. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly as concerns ANAPO's large-city 
vote, one must note the distinction between the lower class in most Latin 
American countries, including Colombia, and the classic European working 
class. In Latin America the rate of urbanization considerably outpaces any 
concomitant availability of industrial employment, and, hence, the forma- 
tion of a class-conscious proletariat in the European sense. Such a prole- 
tariat is the major component neither of the urban lower class in a country 
like Colombia, nor of the ANAPO vote. ANAPO did receive strong support 
from manual workers in 1970, according to the sample surveys. Workers 
were not very numerous in the samples, however, while those workers who 
were also union members in fact tended to favor other candidates. Among 
occupational groups, it was shopkeepers and salesmen, including petty 
tradesmen, as well as domestic servants, who were, proportionately, 
ANAPO's chief supporters.7 
Evidence from elsewhere in Latin America further suggests that urban 
migrants, among whom Rojas showed disproportionate strength in 1970, 
tend to see themselves as representing individual, rather than group or class, 
mobiIity.8 Similarly, surveys show a tendency of ANAPO supporters to 
view its program as providing direct and immediate benefits rather than 
longer-range structural reforms or changes.9 
Thus, even while the 1970 vote for ANAPO in the largest cities polarized 
the electorate along class lines to a degree unprecedented in Colombia, 
there was much to suggest that class struggle was not necessarily implied. 
Furthermore, the available evidence concerning voting patterns outside the 
large cities indicates that ANAPO's roots are by no means entirely a product 
of urban malaise. 
True, when the municipios of the country are ranked by size into six 
categories, ANAPO's vote proves to be greater in the largest cities, and 
there is a noticeable tendency for the average Anapista vote to decline as 
one moves from the larger communities to the smaller. But the latter 
tendency is neither very consistent category by category nor, in most 
elections, very great beyond the first category, especially if one takes into 
account the undoubtedly greater obstacles to  opposition organization and 
anti-establishment voting in the smaller communities.10 OnIy when one 
compares the vote in "very rural" caserios and corregimientos with the 
corresponding department-wide vote does the disparity in Anapista strength 
become truly striking.1 In fact, fully a third of ANAPO's votes in the 
presidential elections of 1966 and 1970-and almost a half in 1972-came 
from municipios defined as rural.12 
Finally, it should be noted that more than half of the population of such 
major cities as Bogota and Cali is of rural or small town origin,13 while the 
1970 Bogota survey (though not the Cali surveys) showed that those who 
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were born in towns of less than twenty thousand persons had a much 
greater tendency to vote for ANAPO than did those born in larger com- 
munities. 14 
Taken together, the foregoing data clearly demonstrate that ANAPO, as 
the major opposition to the Frente Nacional both in dimension and portent, 
was very far from being merely a product of discontent in Colombia's 
largest cities, and that even those who were urban in residence were not 
necessarily urban in their orientations toward politics. 
Regional voting patterns further point up the fact that ANAPO's strong- 
holds have included parts of the country that are not particularly urban or 
"modern." Of the eight (of twenty-two) departments giving 40% or more 
of their vote to Rojas in 1970, three were indeed those whose capitals were 
Colombia's three largest cities (BogotA, Medellin, and Cali). By almost any 
indicator of development (urbanization, education, income, quality of 
housing, hospital beds per capita) these departments (plus Atlantic0 with 
its capital, Barranquilla) outranked the other Colombian departments, 
usually by some distance. '5  
The other five strong Anapista departments, however, including the only 
three to give Rojas more than 50% of their votes in 1970, were classified by 
Campos and McCamant as "extractive, high tenancy" departments.16 This 
is perhaps something of a misnomer, for one of these, the department of 
Santander, has an important industrial sector centered around oil produc- 
tion and contains Colombia's fifth largest city (Bucaramanga); another 
(Boyaca) has a steel mill at Paz del Rio. Still, for all five the (1964) portion 
of the labor force employed in agriculture was over 50% and for three of 
them more than 60%.17 
Similarly, rank-order correlations at the departmental level, while they 
show a positive correlation of ANAPO's vote with such indicators of 
development as literacy (.42), show an even higher correlation with land 
tenancy (.65).'8 The correlation between religiosity and the vote for ANAPO 
is a modest .41; nevertheless, the strong ANAPO departments do tend to be 
high in religiosity (even while others that are high in religiosity are not 
strongly Anapista). 19 
The evidence is not wholly satisfactory, but it does seem to suggest that 
support for ANAPO among the Colombian electorate does not come solely 
from the more urban and highly developed areas (and not from all of these, 
as indicated by ANAPO's weakness in the country's fourth largest city, 
Barranquilla, on the Atlantic Coast), but also from traditionalist regions 
being penetrated by change, and by migrants from these areas.20 
There is a final relevant question concerning the derivation of the ANAPO 
vote, namely, to which party did that vote go prior to the rise of the new 
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party? First of all, especially in 1970, ANAPO drew previous abstainers to 
the polls-presumably including many of the least "modern" and least 
politically efficacious among the ~i t izenry.~ '  Secondly, although in 1970 
in the large cities ANAPO drew relatively more heavily from the Liberals 
than from the Conservatives, the majority of ANAPO voters, both nation- 
wide and over a number of elections, have tended to be erstwhile Conserva- 
tives, and hence somewhat more clerically-oriented and somewhat more 
rural in background than other Colombians. This is evident both from re- 
sponses to the Bogota and Cali surveys and from the fact that, during the days 
of the Frente Nacional when all candidates had by law to run either as 
Conservatives or as Liberals, Anapista candidates running under the Con- 
servative label as a rule garnered more votes than did Liberal Anapistas.22 
It should also be noted in this connection that ANAPO began its electoral 
life as a Conservative faction, and that the two times General Rojas himself 
ran for president under the Frente Nacional (1962 and 1970), he ran as a 
Conservative. 
In short, ANAPO's electoral support has derived in considerable part 
from voters who were previous supporters of the Conservative Party, the 
principal political bulwark of Colombian traditionalism. 
The traditionalist elements of Anapista support are further illustrated by 
certain facts of a non-electoral nature. One of the most vociferous organiza- 
tions backing General Rojas in 1970 was Patrianal, a reserve officers' asso- 
ciation.23 ANAPO congressmen also manifest a relatively high level of 
contact with the clergy, and are highest of all the political factions in the 
number of visits they receive from representatives of peasant groups.24 
Supportive groups conspicuously do not include many labor unions. Al- 
though ANAPO congressmen report extensive contact with labor union 
leaders, such contacts do not often include leaders of the major labor con- 
federations, the Union of Colombian Workers (UTC) or the Confederation 
of Colombian Workers (CTC).ZS Unions, as organizations, seldom openly 
back ANAPO. 
In summary, then, we have in ANAPO a political movement which in its 
support is more nearly class-based than any in Colombian history, and more 
nearly so than most in Latin America, but which is at the same time a broad, 
heterogeneous coalition including support from some of the more tradition- 
alist redoubts of Colombian political life. Evidence for the latter proposition 
derives from the nature of those urban elements that disproportionately favor 
ANAPO; from the size of the communities from which ANAPO's support 
derives; from the nature of the regions outside the large cities where ANAPO 
has its principal strength; from the political derivation of the ANAPO vote; 
and from the identity of those organized groups with which ANAPO has 
close relationships. 
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111. ANAPO-LEADERSHIP, PROGRAM, A N D  ORGANIZATION 
Examination of ANAPO's leadership, program, and organization bears 
out its characterization as a modern mass movement deeply penetrated by 
elements of traditionalism. 
The social backgrounds of ANAPO congressmen show them to be high- 
status individuals with, however, slightly lower socia1 standing on the average 
than congressmen of the various factions of the traditional parties.26 
In general, Anapista leaders are probably best depicted as "marginal" 
members of the Colombian elite-not usuaIly part of the real "Establish- 
ment" or members of elite organizations such as the Jockey Club, but at the 
same time not differing markedly in status from the elites of the traditional 
parties. 
Of course, it might reasonably be expected from the Conservative political 
origins of the Anapista leaders that they would not represent a genuine 
counter-elite; and it seems indicative that recent defections from ANAPO, 
including that of one of Rojas's sons, have been largely in the direction of a 
return to the Conservative fold. 
It is also suggestive of ANAPO's political character that during the years 
when General Rojas was president-dictator of Colombia, the regime showed 
greater hostility to the industrial than to the landed elite, which of course 
has been the bedrock of traditional Colombia.27 Rojas, though not of 
elite origin, came from a family of small landowners in rural BoyacA. 
A final datum of interest concerning Anapista leadership is that its 
representatives in Congress reported relatively fewer contacts with the 
major economic associations than did those of other parties--except with 
ACOPI, the Association of Small Industrialists.28 The differences are not 
great, but are perhaps indicative of a pattern. The members of ACOPI, 
while of course having high social status vis B vis Colombian society as a 
whole, are marginal in power and prestige compared, say, to  the industrialists 
who are members of the National Association of Manufacturers (ANDI). 
The leadership of ANAPO, then, appears to constitute not a counter-elite 
having its origin in deprived social strata, but rather a marginal elite seeking 
fuller access to the status and material rewards of the system. 
ANAPO's program meanwhile has also reflected the ambiguity of the 
movement and its populist nature.29 The ideological and political platform 
of the party, the party press, and its campaign rhetoric make broad appeals 
to the "popular classes," and often make vitriolic attacks on the personnel, 
policies, and institutions of the developmentalist Frente Nacional. Verbal 
assaults on the overall system of privilege in Colombia abound, replete 
with such assertions as "ANAPO is the revolution." Policy goals in the 
socio-economic field are portrayed as "socialism A la colombiana," and 
include nationalization of oil and other mineral resources, as well as of 
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imports and the Bank of the Republic. The party platform also calls for 
access to housing for all social classes, measures to stem inflation, and the 
like. 
At the same time, there is little inclination to speak of society in terms of 
class divisions or the need for deep-seated structural change. Appeals are to 
"the people" and to "popular unity," rather than to  particular classes or to 
the concept of class struggle. The approach to agrarian policy is indicative, 
as it often is with Latin American political parties and governments. There 
is virtually no talk of land redistribution. The stress is instead on the mistakes 
and maladministration of the governments of the Frente Nacional in carry- 
ing out the current agrarian reform program, and on the need to form 
cooperatives and to increase agricultural productivity. 
When appeals are directed at specific groups, they are as often middle- 
status groups such as teachers and retired army officers as they are workers 
or peasants. Symptomatically, the earlier Rojas regime is praised for the 
relative absence of strikes. 
ANAPO sees itself as flourishing amid the failure of both capitalism and 
Marxism, with some attendant emphasis on a "communitarian" ethic, on 
cooperatives, and on the co-management of factories by workers. Its 
"socialist" stance has often seemed to mean little more than state policies 
on behalf of the poor and the middle class, with the possible exception of 
the proposed nationalization of the above-mentioned enterprises. Judging 
by the behavior and pronouncements of ANAPO's congressional delegation, 
we find it quite possible that many Anapistas do not take too seriously a 
program "popular" even to this degree. 
Finally, the party program has important traditionalist elements. Military 
terms and references are quite frequent, while the party refers to itself not 
only as socialist but also as nationalist and Christian. AH in all, ANAPO's 
program-somewhat vague to begin with-is a mixture of populist and 
traditional appeals with only very modest proposals for fundamental 
structural change. 
Organizationally, in the large urban areas, and especially in Bogotd, 
ANAPO was, at its peak, the most effective party in Colombia. In this, it 
resembled a modern mass party, complete with myriad ward- or barrio-level 
organizations, regular dues and carnets, mass rallies, more or less regular 
party communications media, a centralized command structure, and strict 
party discipline.30 In rural areas, however, and in many departments, the 
relationship of the party to its members and followers appears more closely 
to reflect the traditional roles of patron and client. Relationships within the 
party hierarchy itself, even in urban areas, also have shown traces of tradi- 
tional political styles. 
Meanwhile ANAPO has always been dependent to an unusuaI degree, 
even considering the relatively personalistic factionalism of Colombian 
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party politics, on the leadership and personalities of General Rojas and his 
daughter, Maria Eugenia, the party's candidate for president in 1974. The 
party media (including both press and radio) contain constant references to, 
and praise of, both. All command decisions, including the appointment and 
expulsion of party officers at the departmental level, emanate from the top 
leadership and are enforced hierarchically. There is little real collective 
decision-making in the party, and little pretense of it (distinguishing ANAPO 
from most European mass parties, for example). There is little, either, of 
the kind of elite collegiality which tends to govern the Liberal and Conserva- 
tive parties, and little of their decentralization and diffuseness of organiza- 
tion. The role of the leader(s), characteristic of populism, has been 
paramount. 
Therefore, while with regard to mass mobilization ANAPO was in its 
heyday the most modern party in Colombia, nationwide it bore a number 
of the organizational traits of Colombia's traditional parties. In the last 
analysis it has been very much the product of mobilization "from above" 
by a party leadership centered in a caudillo atld his family and close 
associates, 
IV. ANAPO-CHANGE AND DECLINE 
ANAPO, of course, has not remained entirely what it was at its inception 
or in its years of early growth. Particularly after .its near-victory in the 
presidential election of April 1970, and its formal founding as a party in 
June 1971, it has undergone changes-some quite obvious, others more 
subtle-which bear significantly both on a fully adequate interpretation of 
ANAPO's role under the Frente Nacional and on its future in post-1974 
Colombian politics. Such changes do not negate what has already been 
said about ANAPO in the years of its electoral rise and organizational 
maturing, but they do introduce certain qualifications. 
Data from a 1972 post-electoral survey carried out in Bogotri essentially 
replicate, although with diminished sharpness, the 1970 data concerning the 
socio-economic characteristics of the urban ANAPO electorate.3' Ideologi- 
cally, however, ANAPO has in recent years moved noticeably leftward. 
Comparing ANAPO's "Decalogue" of the 1970 campaign, for example, with 
Maria Eugenia's twelve-point platform of 1974, one sees a definite shift of 
emphasis, both in content and phraseology. Whereas three of the ten points 
of the "Decalogue" concerned governmental mechanisms and relations 
with the Church, these matters are not mentioned in the 1974 platform. 
Instead, there is talk of "the progressive nationalization of basic industries," 
and of "a profound, drastic, and massive agrarian reform," language that 
did not appear in 1970.32 
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The generational transfer of effective leadership of the party from 
General Rojas to his daughter-who was always closer to the urban mass 
base of the Anapista electorate than was her father-partly accounts for 
such changes, as does the entry into the party of intellectuals from other 
political homes who were seeking in ANAPO a viable alternative to the 
traditional parties. Partly, though, the apparent change has evidently been 
a matter of tactics, with ANAPO leaders interpreting the 1972 fall-off in 
their vote as meaning that ANAPO had to take a stronger class-oriented 
line in order to make up for the partisan factional vote that had once accrued 
to it under the restricted competitive conditions of the Frente Nacional.33 
As for ANAPO's leadership and organization, Maria Eugenia had 
increasingly become the real leader of the party well before her father's death 
in January 1975. In fact, by the early 1970s Rojas had come to play a largely 
symbolic and legitimizing role, seldom in direct contact with the party 
organization. A number of ANAPO1sfounders and early adherents (although 
by no means all) had Ieft the ranks, as had some of the Liberals who had 
joined in the late 1960s- By the accounts of most observers, the party's 
membership and its grass-roots organization had both fallen well below the 
peak of 1970.34 
Most notably, the party has experienced a marked decline in its electoral 
fortunes. Having captured 38.7% of the popular vote for president in 1970, 
its candidates won only 18.8% in the 1972 elections for departmental 
assemblymen, and a mere 9.4% in the 1974 presidential race.35 
What accounts for the fall-off in the Anapista vote? The explanation is 
in the main speculative, but surely includes the following reasons: 
1) It seems plausible that the constitution of ANAPO as a third party in 
1971 and the approaching end of the National Front's enforced bipartisan- 
ship, heralded by the open competition for departmental legislatures and 
municipal councils in 1972, led many erstwhile Liberals and Conservatives 
to return to their ancestral partisan homes. 
2) The tendency toward radicalization of the party, the more explicitly 
socialist proposals and class-oriented rhetoric of the 1974 campaign, may 
have alienated voters,36 just as it drove from the party some of its long- 
standing loyalists among the leadership, especially in its former Conserva- 
tive wing. By more clearly defining its programs, ANAPO may well have 
lost some of its ability to be all things to all men. Moreover, in choosing to 
make ANAPO somewhat more explicitly class-oriented, the party's leader- 
ship may have misinterpreted the new competitive situation and underesti- 
mated the historic pulls on Colombia's voters of the country's traditional 
multiclass parties.37 
3) The disappointing performance of those Anapistas elected in 1970, 
not only in Congress but also in departmental assemblies and municipal 
councils, where they often held a majority, should also be noted.38 There is 
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little evidence that in any of these legislative bodies Anapistas put forward 
specific programs for the alleviation of the immediate concerns of their 
constituents. Political bickering, sometimes among Anapistas themselves, 
and an alleged unseemly appetite for positions and perquisites, may have 
discouraged the party's followers who, by the very nature of their follower- 
ship, expected instant redress for grievances which no party, in any event, 
could accomplish in short order. 
4) The denial of victory legitimately won in 1970-at least as Rojas's 
supporters saw it-may, too, have played an important role in the downturn 
in ANAPO's subsequent electoral fortunes. In a post-electoral survey 
conducted in 1974 in Bogota, many former ANAPO voters gave this (that 
is, the expectation that their candidate would be denied office even if 
victorious) as the principal reason for not voting for Maria Eugenia.39 
5) In 1974 the fact that the Anapista candidate was a woman may also 
have hurt the party. It was the second most common rationale for their 
failure to vote for ANAPO given by former ANAPO supporters among the 
respondents to the 1974 Bogota survey.40 Maria Eugenia's candidacy may 
also have caused the disaffection of some of the party's more traditionalist 
leaders. 
6) Finally, it seems probable that the peak attained by ANAPO in 1970 
was itself a product of some exceptional circumstances. The vote for Rojas 
was in considerable part a protest against the Frente Nacional and its works, 
which had had their quintessential embodiment in the outgoing administra- 
tion of Carlos Lleras Restrepo. The purported emphasis by the Lleras 
government on "development" a t  the expense of "social justice," on "tech- 
nical" as opposed to  "human" solutions, fueled the protest, as did scandals 
in some government agencies. During the course of the campaign, more- 
over, ANAPO-assisted by the denunciations of spokesmen for the Frente 
Naci~nal~~--became identified as the principal focus of opposition to the 
Front. Perhaps even more important, Liberal voters had no Liberal for 
whom to cast their ballots in 1970. Many apparently turned to the "populist" 
Rojas, returning to the fold to votefor a Liberal president in 1974. 
In sum, during the last year or two of the National Front, ANAPO be- 
came somewhat more coherently organized in an ideological sense, and 
more socialist-oriented, and to that extent less vaguely populist. There was 
'also some change in its leadership and organization. At the same time, and 
most strikingly, it lost much of its earlier support, although as noted this 
may have been as much the cause of ideological change as viceversa. 
Immediately following its 1974 debacle, ANAPO announced long-range 
plans for improving and expanding its radio outlets, for making Alerta 
into a daily paper, and for the more effective participation of workers, 
peasants, and other groups in the life of the party. It claimed that it had 
attained the important goal of establishing itself as a viable third party in 
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free competition with Conservatives and Liberals.42 Yet ANAPO was 
clearly badly demoralized, with deep-seated fissures showing between 
traditionalist and leftist elements in the party.43 With its original caudillo 
dead, its future remained highly uncertain. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The nature of its organization, as well as aspects of its program and 
leadership composition, strongly suggest that ANAPO never really consti- 
tuted a genuine counter-elite, despite its electoral base among the lower 
social strata of Colombian cities. Rather, it more nearly comprised a move- 
ment of dissident or marginal members of the elite manipulating the masses 
in the name of social justice, but essentially to promote their own political/ 
economic advance. 
Put another way, ANAPO has represented the political protest of those 
among both elites and masses who see economic development proceeding 
without full benefits or full participation accruing to  them. It is both led 
and supported, however, by those who, by and large, see roles for them- 
selves within the (albeit possibly modified) system, rather than by those 
seeking real structural change. It has indeed-for example, in the largely 
Conservative origins of its top leaders and the tendency of some of them to 
return to the fold of the mother party--certain of the attributes of a faction 
of one of Colombia's traditional parties. In fact, ANAPO has had a good 
deal of the negative protest movement about it, conjoining a number of 
disparate groups and political tendencies which for varying reasons opposed 
the political arrangements or the deveiopmentalist policies of the Frente 
National. 
ANAPO is, then, not really opposed to the existing socio-political struc- 
ture nor is it really a revolutionary party. At the same time, by its appeal to 
"the people," against the "oligarchs" and across traditional party lines, as 
well as in its political loyalty to a former military dictator, it has carried at 
least an implicit threat, not just to the personnel, policies, or mechanics of 
the Frente Naciortal, but also to many of the fundamental political and 
social assumptions of the Colombian system. 
*Most important for Colombia's developmental future, ANAPO has 
been instrumental in fostering a partial tilt in the axis of socio-political 
conflict from an essentially vertical one (between multiclass parties) in the 
direction of a horizontal, class-defined axis, especially, though not exclu- 
sively, in the realm of voting behavior. Even should ANAPO fade as a 
political movement in the later 1970s, it seems unlikely that over the long 
term partisan competition in Colombia will wholly revert to its previous 
virtually non-class nature. 
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Yet while its mass, lower-class dimension has perhaps been ANAPO's 
most striking and important feature, to characterize it as a genuine class- 
oriented or revolutionary party omits or distorts significant aspects of its 
life as a political movement. 
Rather, we have in ANAPO what I have called populism, or what Gino 
Germani has referred t o  as a "national popular" movement which seems 
"to represent the peculiar form of intervention of the traditional strata in 
the national political process in the course of rapid mobilization in countries 
of delayed industrialization."44 
What stands out is the ambivalence and ambiguity of such movements, 
seeking as they do  immediate benefits, including upward economic, social, 
and political mobility for their leaders, and welfare, public works, and entry 
into the consumer society for their followers, without paying the presumed 
cost of genuine development by real structural or attitudinal change, A 
desire for the rewards of development coincides with a kind of resistance 
to it, or to certain of its aspects or consequences. 
There is a tendency for particular populist movements to be short-lived, 
because of their own internal contradictions and their frequent dependence 
on a certain leader or  given set of circumstances.4s But this type of movement 
can be expected to recur-in Colombia and in many other parts of Latin 
America-as a consequence of the persistence of the fundamental conditions 
that foster it. 
It could, in fact, be argued that populism is the most "natural" type of 
mass movement for the sort of corporatist societies depicted by Philippe 
Schmitter as especially characteristic of contemporary Latin American 
politics. Such societies are rooted in late or delayed development, in which 
rapid urbanization far outpaces the growth of industrialization and an 
industrial proletariat, and where mass mobilization is controlled "from 
above" by governments, parties, and elites. Some of these aspects of late 
development are in turn reinforced by Hispanic political culture (e.g., in 
their corporatist aspects) and by external dependency.46 In Colombia's 
case, its long heritage of popular loyalty to  vertically-structured parties may 
enhance its susceptibility to mass mobilization by traditional elites. 
Thus, in Colombia and in countries like Colombia, especially in Latin 
America, populist parties and movements like ANAPO tend to be more 
significant than strictly class-oriented, Marxist, and/or  revolutionary 
parties, as political responses to the advent of mass suffrage amid the strains 
and prospects of the early-to-middle stages of the industrial revolution. 
More often than revolutionary change under the aegis of a counter-elite, 
and at least as common as a pluralistic approach, populism, in the guise of 
marginal elites mobilizing a heterogeneous mass and unified around a 
leader, is the typical Latin American reaction to developmentalism. It is 
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perhaps not a coincidence that, when in 1974 ANAPO sought to give its 
program a more explicitly class-oriented and revolutionary cast, it suffered 
a marked decline in its fortunes. 
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